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Abstract	
Health	Information	Technology	(HIT)	is	now	widely	promoted	as	a	means	for	improving	patient	
safety.	The	technology	could	also,	under	certain	conditions,	pose	hazards	to	patient	safety.	
However,	current	definitions	of	hazards	are	generic	and	hard	to	interpret,		particularly	for	large	
HIT	in	complex	socio-technical	settings,	i.e.	involving	interacting	clinical,	organisational	and	
technological	factors.	In	this	paper,	we	develop	a	new	conceptualisation	for	the	notion	of	
hazards	and	implement	this	conceptualisation	in	a	tool-supported	methodology	called	the	
Safety	Modelling,	Assurance	and	Reporting	Toolset	(SMART).	SMART	aims	to	support	clinicians	
and	engineers	in	performing	hazard	identification	and	risk	analysis	and	producing	a	safety	case	
for	HIT.	Through	a	pilot	study,	we	used	and	examined	SMART	for	developing	a	safety	case	for	
electronic	prescribing	in	three	acute	hospitals.	Our	results	demonstrate	the	ability	of	SMART	to	
ensure	that	the	safety	evidence	is	generated	based	on	explicit	traceability	between	the	clinical	
models	and	HIT	functionality.	They	also	highlight	challenges	concerning	identifying	hazards	in	a	
consistent	way,	with	clear	impact	on	patient	safety	in	order	to	facilitate	clinically-meaningful	
risk	analysis.	
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1	Introduction		
The	introduction	of	Health	Information	Technology	(HIT)	can	have	positive	and	negative	impact	
on	patient	safety	1,	2,	3.	In	this	paper,	we	focus	on	the	potential	hazards	and	associated	risks	
rather	than	on	the	expected	benefits.	In	this	regard,	different	international	and	national	
standards	and	initiatives	have	emphasised	the	importance	of	adopting	safety	risk	management	
principles	for	the	design	and	deployment	of	HIT	4,	5,	6.	These	typically	are	centred	on	an	explicit	
description	of	the	technology	and	its	context,	the	identification	of	the	hazards	and	the	
assessment	and	management	of	the	risks	associated	with	these	hazards	during	the	design,	use	
and	maintenance	of	the	technology	7,	8.	
	
The	systematic	and	proactive	implementation	of	these	principles	is	well	understood	and	
established	in	traditional	engineering	domains	such	as	aviation	and	nuclear	power	9.	In	such	
domains,	the	technology,	procedures	and	organisations	are	well	defined	and	controlled,	as	are	
the	system	boundaries	and	interfaces.	This	enables	focused	hazard	identification	and	risk	
analysis	10.	
	
However,	the	above	cannot	be	assumed	in	healthcare	11.	This	is	mainly	due	to	the	inherent	
complexity,	flexibility	and	scale	of	healthcare	services,	some	of	which	are	irreducible,	e.g.	
varying	the	care	in	order	to	suit	patients	with	different	clinical	conditions,	together	with	
individual	and	social	needs	and	constraints	12.	This,	in	turn,	complicates	the	safety	analysis	
processes	for	HIT.	Such	processes	require	a	clear	and	structured	description	of	the	clinical	
environment	within	which	the	technology	is	deployed	13.	These	safety	processes	focus	on	two	
notions:	hazards	and	risks.	
	
A	hazard	is	defined	as	“a	potential	source	of	harm	to	a	patient”	14	while	a	risk	is	the	“combination	
of	the	severity	of	harm	to	a	patient	and	the	likelihood	of	occurrence	of	that	harm”	14.	In	an	
environment	in	which	harm	and	risk	are	predominantly	caused	by	the	clinical	conditions	and	
the	complexity	of	clinical	practice,	identifying	technology-related	hazards	and	associated	risks	is	
easier	described	than	realised.	That	is,	especially	in	critical	care	and	cases	involving	chronic	
diseases	or	comorbodities,	the	risk	to	patients	due	to	clinical	complications	and	complex	clinical	
decisions,	e.g.	whether	to	operate	or	not,	often	outweighs	the	risk	caused	by	technology-related	
errors,	e.g.	late	retrieval	of	electronic	records.	In	such	a	high-risk	environment,	there	is	a	
significant	challenge	in		identifying,	justifying	and	agreeing	on	a	set	of	potential	sources	of	harm	
posed	by	HIT	15.	In	other	words,	there	are	many	different	ways	in	which	HIT	could	fail	to	meet	
its	intended	purpose	(e.g.		due		to	usability,	hardware,	software	and	network	errors).	The	
challenge	lies	in	identifying	and	prioritising	a	subset	of	these	failure	modes	that	could	lead	to	a	
clinical	hazard	and	compromise	patient	safety.	 
	
Despite	its	central	role	in	safety	processes,	the	concept	of	hazard	is	loosely	defined	in	the	safety	
literature.	The	above	definition	by	NHS	Digital	in	England	is	consistent	with	the	definition	
offered	by	the	International	Organization	for	Standardization	(ISO)	of	a	hazard	as	a	“potential	
source	of	harm”	16.	This	is	also	the	same	as	the	definition	provided	by	the	International	
Electrotechnical	Commission	(IEC)	in	the	generic	functional	safety	standard	IEC	61508	17.	
Beyond	healthcare,	in	aviation,	the	US	Federal	Aviation	Administration	(FAA)	defines	a	hazard	
as	a	“condition	that	could	foreseeably	cause	or	contribute	to	an	aircraft	accident”	18.	In	defence,	
the	UK	Ministry	of	Defence	defines	a	hazard	as	a	“physical	situation	or	state	of	a	system,	often	
following	from	some	initiating	event,	that	may	lead	to	an	accident”	19.	In	the	academic	literature,	
Leveson	refines	existing	definitions	by	emphasising	the	role	of	the	environment.	She	defines	a	
hazard	as	a	“system	state	or	set	of	conditions	that,	together	with	a	particular	set	of	worst-case	
environmental	conditions,	will	lead	to	an	accident	(loss)”	20.	Although	all	of	the	aforementioned	
definitions	agree	on	hazards	as	sources,	states,	conditions	or	situations	that	can	lead	to	harm,	
they	do	not	provide	criteria	that	can	help	reduce	the	generic	scope	of	the	term,	and	hence	to	
identify	hazards	in	practice.		
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Our	recent	review	of	HIT	safety	practices	in	England	56	supports	this	view,	highlighting	that	the	
“identified	HIT	hazards,	and	their	associated	risks	and	controls,	are	rarely	specific	to	the	system	
and	the	clinical	environment,	or	justified	in	sufficient	detail,	to	enable	the	stakeholders	to	evaluate	
and,	where	necessary,	challenge	the	safety	beliefs	about	the	system”	56.	It	is	important	to	note	that,	
like	hazards,	there	is	much	debate	about	risk	and	the	way	in	which	it	has	been	approached	from	
different	perspectives	21,	22.	
	
In	this	paper,	we	present	a	tool-supported	methodology	for	supporting	proactive	and	
systematic	hazard	identification	and	risk	analysis	for	HIT.	In	particular,	our	paper	considers	
three	questions:	
Q1. What	is	a	consistent	and	clear	conceptualisation	of	hazards	for	HIT?	
Q2. How	can	this	conceptualisation	be	implemented?	
Q3. To	what	extent	is	treating	hazard	as	a	central	concept	useful	for	HIT	safety	analysis?	
	
In	order	to	answer	Q1,	we	developed	a	new	conceptualisation	for	hazards	for	HIT	building	on	
our	review	of	hazard	identification	practices	and	existing	definitions	of	hazards	in	safety	
standards	and	the	literature.	For	Q2,	we	implemented	this	conceptualisation	in	a	tool-supported	
methodology	called	the	Safety	Modelling,	Assurance	and	Reporting	Toolset	(SMART)1.	SMART	
aims	to	support	clinicians	and	engineers	in	modelling	the	clinical,	organisational	and	
technological	aspects,	in	an	integrated	manner,	and	performing	hazard	identification	and	risk	
analysis	for	HIT.	For	Q3,	through	a	pilot	study,	we	used	and	examined	SMART,	and	its	
underpinning	hazard	conceptualisation,	for	developing	a	safety	case	for	electronic	prescribing	
in	three	acute	hospitals	and	discussed	and	reflected	on	the	lessons	learnt	from	different	
technical	and	clinical	perspectives.	
	
The	rest	of	paper	is	organised	as	follows.	In	Section	2,	we	present	our	conceptualisation	of	
hazards	for	HIT.	In	Section	3,	we	introduce	SMART	as	a	tool-supported	methodology	for	
implementing	this	conceptualisation.	In	Section	4,	we	present	a	pilot	study	on	the	use	of	SMART	
for	analysing	the	safety	of	electronic	prescribing	in	three	acute	hospitals.	In	Section	5,	we	
discuss	our	results	and	explore	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	our	approach.	Finally,	in	
Section	6,	we	present	our	conclusions.	
	
2	Conceptualising	Hazards	for	HIT	
The	list	of	hazard	definitions	discussed	in	Section	1	shows	a	lack	of	clarity,	focus	and	
consistency	in	how	the	fundamental	concept	of	hazard	is	described.	Building	on	the	results	and	
recommendations	in	the	recent	review	of	HIT	safety	practices	by	Habli	et	al	56,	we	define	the	
following	criteria	for	the	concept	of	hazards	as	a	basis	for	improving	hazard	identification	
practices	for	HIT:	
	
(1)	The	impact	of	a	hazard	on	patient	care	is	clear:	A	hazard	should	be	primarily	clinically	
oriented	and	not	technologically	oriented	in	order	to	show	the	relevance	of	the	hazard	to	
patient	harm.	This	is	fundamental,	particularly	for	determining	severity	during	risk	analysis	14,	
16.	For	example,	the	loss	of	power	sources	for	a	HIT	system	is	a	significant	failure	and	a	potential	
source	of	many	hazards.	However,	it	is	not	a	hazard	because	the	link	to	patient	harm	is	neither	
clear	nor	necessarily	direct.	However,	a	late	diagnosis	or	a	wrong	prescription	are	hazards	
because	the	potential	clinical	impact	is	relatively	easy	to	determine	(e.g.	disease	progression	or	
unintended	drug	interactions).	That	is,	diagnosis	and	prescribing	hazards	are	conditions	of	the	
diagnosis	and	prescribing	processes,	and	not	the	technological	processes	(although	the	
technology	is	potentially	a	major	contributory	factor).	As	such,	these	hazards	exist	in	clinical	
practices	prior	to	the	deployment	of	the	digital	solution	and	should	equally	apply	to	paper-
																																								 																					
1	The	toolset	is	available	to	download	at	https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/safedh/SMART.html		
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based	solutions.	With	the	introduction	of	a	HIT	system,	some	of	the	existing	clinical	hazards	will	
start	to	emerge	through,	and	on	the	interface	of,	the	HIT	functionality,	e.g.	electronically	issuing	
a	wrong	prescription.	
		
(2)	Hazards	occur	on	the	boundaries	of	the	clinical	systems:	hazards	are	system-level	conditions.	
As	such,	a	clear	and	consistent	definition	and	characteristics	of	the	different	clinical	systems	and	
their	contextual	settings	is	fundamental,	including	how	and	the	extent	to	which	the	HIT	
functionality	supports	these	systems	at	the	boundary	level		(Figure	1).	For	example,	the	setting	
being	analysed	might	comprise	one	national	system,	e.g.	electronic	referrals,	or	a	set	of	
independent	yet	interrelated	medication	management	systems,	e.g.	electronic	prescribing,	
preparation,	administration,	monitoring	and	reconciliation	systems.	The	responsibility	of	each	
of	these	clinical	systems,	and	the	associated	system	hazards,	primarily	lies	with	the	relevant	and	
accountable	clinical	authority,	e.g.	physicians,	pharmacists	or	nurses.	Currently,	hazards	are	
defined	either	at	a	too	low	level	to	reflect	potential	harm	to	patients	or	very	genericly	to	enable	
a	clear	and	meaningful	link	to	the	clinical	environment	56.	 
	
Figure	1:	System	Boundary	
	
(3)	The	position	of	a	hazard	should	allow	sufficient	space	for	detection	and	mitigation:	hazards	are	
useful	concepts	in	that	if	they	are	controlled,	the	risk	of	different	types	of	harm	is	reduced.	The	
positioning	of	the	hazards	should	ensure	that	neither	the	hazard	nor	its	potential	harm	are	
inevitable.	That	is,	controls	can	be	put	in	place	to	detect	and	mitigate	failures	and	faults	that	can	
lead	to	the	hazard.	Equally,	controls	can	be	deployed	to	detect	and	mitigate	the	transition	from	
the	hazard	to	potential	patient	harm.	This	is	often	represented	in	the	form	of	a	bowtie	diagram	
23	(Figure	2).	In	this	regard,	safety	standards	for	HIT,	e.g.	those	provided	by	the	NHS,	emphasise	
the	need	to	distinguish	between	existing	and	additional	controls	for	detecting	and	mitigating	the	
causes	and	effects	of	the	hazards	14.		
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Figure	2:	Bowtie	Diagram	
	
(4)	Hazards	are	major	failure	conditions	but	not	all	major	failure	conditions	are	hazards:	consider	
a	significant	event	such	as	the	complete	loss	of	IT	or	shortage	of	clinical	staff.	These	do	not	
necessarily	constitute	a	hazard.	Rather,	these	are	common	causes	for	many	hazards	and	can	
often	even	be	more	dangerous	than	a	single	clinical	hazard.	These	common	causes	should	be	
identified	and	managed	through	different	techniques	and	processes	(e.g.	using	Fault	Trees	24).	
Labeling	every	single	major	condition	as	a	hazard	could	result	in	an	excessively	large	Hazard	
Log,	and	dilute	the	effort	available	for	managing	genuine	hazards.	It	could	also	lead	to	
information	overload	and	inconsistent	hazard	definitions	(i.e.	hazards	at	different	levels	of	
granularity).		
	
3	SMART:	Tool-Supported	Methodology	for	Hazard	Identification	
and	Risk	Analysis	
A	fundamental	aspect	of	the	above	conceptualisation	is	the	linkage	between	the	clinical	
processes	and	settings	on	the	one	hand	and	the	HIT	functionality	on	the	other	hand.	A	hazard	
associated	with	the	technology	cannot	be	identified,	and	its	risk	analysed,	in	isolation	from	the	
healthcare	setting.		
	
To	support	the	above	and	to	operationalise	the	hazard	conceptualisation	in	Section	2,	we	
developed	the	Safety	Modelling,	Assurance	and	Reporting	Toolset	(SMART).	SMART	provides	a	
self-contained	platform	for	developing	explicit	clinical	safety	cases	for	HIT	5.	A	safety	case	
documents	an	argument,	based	on	the	evidence	i.e.	mainly	based	on	hazard	identification	and	
risk	analysis,	for	why	the	system	is	considered	to	be	safe	for	a	given	application	in	a	given	
environment	14.		In	SMART,	the	safety	analysis	is	clinically	driven	through	a	structured	model	of	
the	clinical	processes	and	an	explicit	description	of	the	care	settings.	
	
The	development	of	SMART	has	been	model	driven,	based	on	the	Eclipse	Modelling	Framework	
(EMF)	28,	which	provided	the	basic	structure	of	the	Java	code.	The	core	aspects	of	the	data	model	
are	described	in	Section	3.2.	The	development	of	the	toolset	has	been	agile	and	iterative,	
allowing	continuous	feedback	from	the	clinical	users,	representing	NHS	Digital	and	different	
healthcare	providers	and	technology	firms.	The	primary	users	of	the	tool	are	the	Clinical	Safety	
Officers	(CSOs)	14	who,	in	their	capacity	as	experienced	clinicians,	are	expected	to	lead	the	HIT	
risk	management	activities.	CSOs	are	typically	supported	by	a	team	of	clinicians,	engineers	and	
analysts.		
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From	a	methodological	perspective,	SMART	implements	the	hazard	conceptualisation	by	
supporting	three	central	HIT	risk	management	activities	14:	
¥ Modelling	the	clinical	context	and	the	HIT	system,	ensuring	that	(1)	the	clinical	setting,	
including	the	decision	making	process	and	the	flow	of	clinical	activities,	(2)	the	HIT	
functions	and	(3)	the	mapping	between	the	clinical	setting	and	HIT	functions	are	
explicitly	defined;			
¥ Identifying	hazards	in	the	modeled	clinical	setting,	ensuring	that	the	hazards	associated	
with	the	HIT	functions	are	explicitly	traced	to	the	contextual	factors;	
¥ Analysing	the	risks	associated	with	the	identified	hazards,	showing	how	these	risks,	and	
their	control	measures,	could	vary	across	different	clinical	settings	and	HIT	functions.	
	
These	activities	are	described	in	the	next	3	sections,	with	emphasis	on	the	explicit	interlinks	
between	the	clinical	and	technological	factors,	including	the	underlying	SMART	data	model	and	
the	key	user-interface	aspects	of	the	tool	design.			
3.1	Clinical	Context	and	HIT	Modelling		
Central	to	the	design	of	SMART	is	a	graphical	flow-charting	interface	through	which	a	clinical	
process	of	activities	and	decisions	can	be	modelled.	This	is	in	essence	similar	to	process	
mapping	with	which	clinicians	are	already	familiar.	The	diagrams	produced	using	the	toolset	
represent	the	sequence	of	steps	that	a	patient	may	encounter	as	they	progress	through	the	care	
system	(Figure	3).	We	refer	to	these	diagrams	as	“Care	Processes”,	and	it	is	through	them	that	
the	core	information	for	Hazard	Identification	and	Risk	Analysis	is	collected	(i.e.	safety	in	the	
clinical	context).	This	simple	representation	provides	an	expressive	means	for	describing	
pathways	of	care	while	being	simple	and	intuitive	enough	to	use	with	little	training.	Within	a	
care	process,	an	activity	represents	some	action	carried	out	in	a	health	or	social	care	setting.	In	
order	to	ensure	specificity	in	the	identification	of	HIT-related	hazards,	the	care	process	editor	in	
SMART	allows	activities	and	decisions	to	be	associated	with	particular	HIT	functions.	The	HIT	
systems	and	their	associated	functions	are	defined	by	the	user	in	a	separate	section	of	SMART	–	
the	‘System	Editor’.	SMART	also	allows	the	user	to	define	“Care	Settings”,	which	describe	and	
correspond	to	services	and	locations,	e.g.	Maternity	Unit	or	Pharmacy,	that	a	patient	may	visit	or	
use	during	the	process	of	receiving	care.	A	setting	may	be	associated	with	an	activity/decision	in	
the	Care	Process,	thus	providing	additional	context	for	the	activity/decision,	e.g.	the	level	of	
staffing	or	noise	in	the	defined	setting.	
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Figure	3:	SMART	Care	Process	Model	
3.2	Hazard	Identification	
Within	SMART,	the	concept	of	a	hazard	is	decomposed	into	two	related	aspects.	Firstly,	the	user	
may	create	“Hazard	Types”	with	no	reference	to	the	context	within	which	they	may	occur	(e.g.	
late	prescription	or	wrong	dose).	Secondly,	the	user	can	associate	a	“Hazard	Instance”	to	any	
Hazard	Type.	Instances	are	specific	occurrences	of	the	hazard	defined	by	the	associated	Hazard	
Type.	To	enforce	contextualisation	of	Hazard	Instances,	they	must	be	associated	with	both	an	
Activity	or	Decision	in	a	Care	Process	and	a	System	Function.	In	effect,	this	ensures	that	Hazard	
Instances	are	only	discussed	in	a	specific	context	(e.g.	‘wrong	dose	prescribed	by	an	Obstetrician	
in	a	Maternity	ward’),	thereby	helping	to	provide	a	shared	contextual	understanding	about	the	
relative	risk	of	a	hazard.	The	degree	of	specificity	in	describing	the	relevant	contextual	factors	
will	inevitably	depend	on	the	clinical	setting	and	the	stage	at	which	the	analysis	is	performed	
(i.e.	during	design	or	deployment).	For	instance,	a	high-level	description	of	a	hazard	as	‘wrong	
dose	prescribed	in	secondary	care’	might	be	sufficient	for	a	technology	firm	to	allow	the	
engineers	to	design	holistic	controls	such	as	automated	rules	for	dose	range	checking.	However,	
once	a	HIT	system	is	selected	for	deployment	in	a	specific	clinical	setting,	the	clinicians	and	
engineer	will	have	to	be	more	detailed	in	the	description	of	the	contextual	factors,	e.g.	‘wrong	
dose	of	insulin	prescribed	for	a	pregnant	diabetic	women	by	an	Obstetrician	in	a	Maternity	
ward’.	This	might	allow	the	health	organisation	to	deploy	additional	controls	that	suit	the	
specific	clinical	context,	e.g.	varying	the	degree	of	dose	cross-checking	depending	on	medication	
or	the	experience	of	the	prescriber.		
	
In	essence,	in	SMART,	a	Hazard	Instance	is	a	product	of	four	components:		
Hazard	Instance	=	Hazard	Type	x	Clinical	Setting	x	Clinical	Step	x	System	function.	
	
The	above	is	shown	in	the	SMART	data	model	extract	in	Figure	4,	and	illustrated	in	grey.	The	
model,	defined	in	the	Unified	Modelling	Language	(UML)	25,	specifies	the	relationships	between	
the	primary	concepts	in	SMART.	A	Hazard	Instance	has	mandatory	links	with	a	Hazard	Type	and	
a	Clinical	Step	(which	in	turn	has	to	be	associated	with	a	Clinical	Setting).	A	Hazard	Instance	has	
a	link	with	a	System	Function,	which	can	be	optional	in	order	to	allow	the	identification	of	non-
HIT	related	Hazard	Instances.	It	is	important	to	note	that	SMART,	in	this	respect,	aims	to	ensure	
	
To	appear	in	the	Health	Informatics	Journal	
that	the	necessarily	types	of	links	are	established.	However,	it	is	neither	possible	nor	desirable	
for	the	tool	to	dictate	the	content	of	the	hazard	description,	especially	as	the	analyses	and	the	
safety	case	are	expected	to	evolve	in	an	incremental	manner	as	a	collaboration	between	the	
engineers	and	clinicians.			
	
Figure	4:	Data	Model	Extract	
3.3	Risk	Analysis		
Hazard	Instances	are	associated	with	several	other	pieces	of	information.	Severity	and	
likelihood	ratings	must	be	specified	for	all	Hazard	Instances,	hence	determining	the	level	of	risk,	
typically	based	on	a	Risk	Matrix,	i.e.	determining	the	level	of	risk	based	on	the	likelihood	of	the	
harm	against	the	potential	severity	of	the	harm.	It	is	important	to	identify	the	difference	
between	initial	and	residual	risk	ratings.	Initial	risk	ratings	are	those	which	describe	the	hazard	
instance	before	the	implementation	of	controls.	Residual	risk	ratings	define	the	same	three	
elements	(severity,	likelihood	and	risk)	after	the	implementation	of	controls.	Much	of	this	data	
corresponds	to	the	entries	in	the	“Hazard	Log”	section	of	the	clinical	safety	case	report	template	
developed	by	NHS	Digital	14.	Thus,	with	the	addition	of	some	extra	information	provided	in	
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another	integrated	editor,	SMART	automatically	generates	and	exports	conformant	reports	
using	the	data	from	modelling	and	analysis	in	the	tool.	
	
3.4	Traceability		
The	traditional	approach	of	presenting	HIT	safety	evidence	as	written	clinical	safety	case	
reports	or	spreadsheets	makes	it	difficult	to	understand	the	connections	between	various	
components	of	the	analysis.	SMART’s	data	model	was	structured	to	ensure	that	the	logical	
relationships	between	the	model	components	as	depicted	in	Figure	4	are	automatically	
established	and	managed.		All	of	the	data	is	user	defined	as	they	require	expertise	and	
judgement	of	both	clinical	and	engineering	staff.	However,	by	enforcing	these	relationships,	the	
inherent	structure	of	dependencies	between	the	constituent	parts	of	the	hazard	and	risk	
analysis	is	clarified.		
	
Although	SMART	insists	on	specifying,	as	a	minimum,	a	care	setting,	a	care	process,	a	HIT	
function	and	a	hazard	type	as	a	prerequisite	for	declaring	a	hazard	instance	(i.e.	in	order	to	
ensure	that	the	hazard	instances	are	clinically	meaningful	and	traceable),	the	approach	is	
flexible	in	the	level	of	detail	that	a	user	enters	in	describing	care	settings	and	processes,	leaving	
it	to	the	user	to	select	an	appropriate	sociotechnical	model	26,	27	and	the	granularity	of	the	
clinical	activities	and	decisions,	considering	the	complexity	and	criticality	of	the	HIT	
deployment.			
4	Pilot	Study	
As	we	are	interested	in	the	impact	on	practice,	a	pilot	study,	through	an	actual	in-depth	
experience,	is	best	suited	for	exposing	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	hazard	
conceptualisation	and	its	implementation	in	SMART.	Essentially,	we	are	interested	in	identifying	
and	examining	insights	from	the	use	of	SMART,	i.e.	hurdles,	mitigations	and	workarounds,	as	
well	as	sharing	the	outcomes	of	the	tool,	i.e.	list	of	hazards	and	associated	risks.		
	
4.1	Study	Overview	
The	initial	evaluation	of	SMART	included	the	use	of	the	approach	to	develop	safety	cases	for	two	
HIT	systems	in	four	large	acute	hospitals,	one	national	clinical	service,	one	app	and	one	
telehealth	platform.	In	this	paper,	we	describe	a	HIT	deployment	in	acute	care,	covering	three	
hospitals,	in	which	SMART	was	used	in	the	Hazard	Identification	and	Risk	Analysis	for	an	
electronic	Prescribing	and	Allergies	Management	(ePAM)	system.	
	
Medication	management	was	selected	as	it	is	one	of	the	most	safety-critical	processes	in	
healthcare	29.	Increasingly,	the	process	is	supported	by	HIT,	covering	the	different	phases,	
mainly	prescribing,	preparation	and	verification,	administration	and	monitoring,	including	
supporting	activities	for	reconciliation	and	allergies	management.	Both	the	potential	safety	
benefits	and	risks	associated	with	HIT	for	medication	management	are	highlighted	in	the	
literature	30,	31.	Here,	we	limit	the	scope	to	analysing	and	managing	the	safety	risks	of	ePAM.	
More	specifically,	we	examine	how	proactive	and	systematic	Hazard	Identification	and	Risk	
Analysis,	supported	by	SMART,	can	generate	the	evidence	in	order	to	support	an	explicit	safety	
case	for	a	complex	socio-technical	ePAM.	The	system	is	selected	not	on	its	own	unique	merits	
but	because	it	represents	a	typical	use	of	HIT,	supplied	by	an	external	technology	firm,	in	order	
to	support	prescribing	and	allergies	management	as	part	of	a	wider	HIT	deployment,	e.g.	
including	electronic	health	records.		
	
Eight	multidisciplinary	workshops	were	organised,	including	a	meeting	dedicated	for	planning.	
The	purpose	of	these	workshops	was	to	identify	the	hazards	and	analyse	the	risks	associated	
with	the	deployment	of	ePAM.	SMART	was	used	as	the	primary	approach	for	driving	the	
analysis	and	recording	the	outcomes,	i.e.	producing	a	Hazard	Log	for	ePAM.	The	
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multidisciplinary	team	included	3	clinical	consultants,	2	nurses,	2	pharmacists,	2	safety	
engineers,	2	researchers	and	2	systems	engineers	(representing	the	HIT	supplier).	All	the	
clinicians	have	clinical	lead	roles	in	the	overall	HIT	deployment	project.	The	workshops	were	
used	to	satisfy	three	fundamental	requirements	of	the	safety	standard	SCCI	0160,	which	is	
mandated	by	NHS	England:	(1)	defining	the	scope	of	the	system,	including	the	clinical	settings,	
(2)	identifying	hazards	to	patients	and	(3)	estimating	and	evaluating	risks	before	and	after	the	
deployment	of	risk	control	measures.	The	analysis	is	based	on	a	critical	reflection	about	our	
experiences	with	the	use	of	SMART	for	proactive	HIT	hazard	identification	and	risk	analysis.	
Critical	reflection	is	a	frequently	used	technique	to	learn	from	experience	and	to	improve	
practice	32,	33.		
4.2	Using	SMART	for	the	Safety	Analysis	of	ePAM		
The	results	are	grouped	based	on	the	application	of	SMART	to	define	the	clinical	scope	and	
system	(Section	4.1.1)	and	perform	hazard	identification	(Section	4.1.2)	and	risk	analysis	
(4.1.3). 
4.2.1	Scope	Definition	
The	scope	of	the	analysis	is	Electronic	Prescribing,	including	allergies	management,	in	its	
clinical	context.	As	such,	the	first	challenge	was	to	describe	the	relationship	between	
prescribing,	as	a	clinical	activity,	and	Electronic	Prescribing,	as	a	digital	information	system.	
This	was	seen	as	essential	in	order	to	highlight	that	hazards	caused	by	clinical	factors	were	
outside	the	scope	of	the	analysis,	e.g.	hazards	due	to	an	incorrect	clinical	decision.	That	is,	
Electronic	Prescribing	is	one	of	many	interrelated	human,	social	and	technological	systems	that	
are	used	to	support	prescribing.	Figure	5	shows	the	main	modules	covered	by	medication	
management,	including	prescribing	and	allergies	management.	These	modules	define	the	
clinical	scope	within	which	the	HIT	functionality	is	used.					
	
Figure	5:	Medication	Management	Overview	
	
Prior	to	this	study,	models	of	the	clinical	processes	existed,	created	through	an	exercise	of		
mapping	clinical	practices	and	HIT	functionality.	However,	for	the	purpose	of	Hazard	
Identification,	this	was	seen	as	too	detailed	and	IT-centric,	e.g.	‘click	to	approve’	or	‘right	click	
for	more	options’.	Further,	many	of	these	process	models	were	generated	based	on	predefined	
templates	provided	by	the	supplier.	As	a	result,	in	order	to	improve	the	validity	of	the	processes	
and	emphasise	the	clinical	focus	of	the	Hazard	Identification,	the	multidisciplinary	team	re-
created	the	clinical	process	models	to	describe	the	flow	of	activities	and	decisions	as	perceived	
and	performed	by	the	users,	i.e.	healthcare	staff.	Figure	6	shows	the	transition	from	(A)	a	
detailed	IT-centric	process	model	to	(B)	a	refined	model	created	manually	by	the	clinical	team	
and	(C)	a	further	refinement	of	the	model	by	the	multidisciplinary	team	in	SMART	that	formed	
the	basis	for	the	Hazard	Identification.		
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Figure	6:	Refinement	of	Care	Process	Models	
	
Concerning	the	care	settings	in	which	ePAM	is	used,	the	following	were	specified:	(1)	Inpatient,	
(2)	Outpatient,	(3)	Pharmacy	and	(4)	Community.	Each	of	the	process	steps	in	the	care	models	
had	to	be	associated	with	a	specific	care	setting.	Finally,	18	different	HIT	functions	were	
specified	for	ePAM.	Importantly,	these	functions	were	specified	from	the	user	perspective	(i.e.	
making	it	clear	how	they	serve	a	clinical	purpose).	A	subset	of	these	functions	is	listed	in	Table	
1.	
	
HIT	Function	Name	 Description	
Document	Medication	 Record	in	the	patient’s	health	record	the	medication	that	has	
been	prescribed	
Continue	Medication	 Record	in	the	patient’s	health	record	that	a	decision	has	been	
made	to	continue	with	the		medication	that	has	been	
prescribed	
Discontinue	Medication	 Record	in	the	patient’s	health	record	that	a	decision	has	been	
made	to	discontinue	the		medication	that	has	been	prescribed	
Modify	Medication	 Modify	an	existing	medication	
Add	Allergy	 Add	a	new	medicine	allergy	to	patient’s	health	record	
Modify	Allergy	 Modify	an	existing	medicine	allergy	in	the	patient’s	health	
record	
Record	‘Unable	to	Obtain	Allergies’	 Record	in	the	patient’s	health	record	that	patient’s	allergies	
have	not	been	obtained	in	support	of	the	prescribing	activity	
Sign	 Sign	prescription,	taking	responsibility	for	the	appropriateness	
of	the	prescribed	medication	and	completeness	of	the	
prescription	
Table	1:	HIT	Prescribing	Functions	
	
At	the	end	of	this	phase,	each	HIT	function	was	explicitly	traced	to	specific	clinical	activities	and	
decisions	and	the	settings	within	which	it	is	used.	This	provided	a	basis	for	identifying	the	main	
touch	points	between	the	technology	and	its	specific	clinical	context.	
4.2.2	Hazard	Identification	
The	starting	point	for	Hazard	Identification	was	to	agree	on	an	overall	hazard	classification	that	
is	clinically	meaningful.	We	classified	the	hazards	associated	with	prescribing	through	ePAM	
into	5	types	:		
1. Medication	Choice	Hazards	
2. Medication	Dose	Hazards	
3. Medication	Route	Hazards	
4. Medication	Time	Hazards	
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5. Patient	Identification	Hazards.	
	
These	types	are	based	on	the	five	rights	in	medication	safety	34.	Allergies	management	is	a	
critical	issue	in	the	medication	process.	A	hazard	such	as	‘prescribing	a	medication	to	which	a	
patient	is	allergic’	can	have	severe	consequences	35.	The	team	had	two	options,	either	to	
consider	this	hazard	under	the	‘Medication	Choice	Hazards’,	i.e.	wrong	medication,	or	create	a	
new	type,	i.e.	‘Allergies	Hazards’.	The	team	adopted	the	latter	option	in	order	to	highlight	the	
significance	of	this	type	of	hazard,	which	is	consistent	with	hospital	policy,	and	the	National	
Institute	for	Health	and	Care	Excellence	(NICE)	and	Medicines	and	Healthcare	products	
Regulatory	Agency	(MHRA)	guidance	concerning	allergies	36,	37.	
	
Next,	each	type	was	refined	further	based	on	the	failure	classes	defined	in	the	Software	Hazard	
Analysis	and	Resolution	in	Design	(SHARD)	method	38,	44,	which	is	a	variant	of	the	process	
industries’	Hazard	and	Operability	Study	(HAZOP)	technique	39.	These	failure	classes	are:	
Omission,	Commission,	Early,	Late	and	Incorrect.	That	is,	these	failure	classes,	when	applied	to	a	
Hazard	Type,	refined	the	hazard	conditions	into	specific	Hazard	Instances.	For	example,	Table	2	
shows	the	Hazard	Instances	associated	with	the	Medication	Choice	Hazards	type.			
	
Type:	Medication	Choice	Hazards	
Failure	Classes	 Hazard	Instances	
Omission	 Medication	not	prescribed	when	intended.	
Commission	 Medication	prescribed	when	not	intended.	
Early	 N/A	-	Early	signing	activity	addressed	within	Commission	
Late	 N/A	-	Late		signing	activity	addressed	within	Omission	
Incorrect	 Wrong	medication	prescribed	
Duplicate	medication	prescribed	
Adverse	interaction	
Table	2:	Medication	Choice	Hazards,	Failure	Classes	and	Instances	
	
In	order	to	declare	a	Hazard	Instance	for	ePAM,	the	context	had	to	be	clearly	defined	in	terms	of	
the	clinical	settings	and	steps.	This	was	performed	based	on	the	clinical	processes	described	in	
the	Scope	Definition	section.	For	example,	in	the	prescribing	process	model	(Figure	3),	a	
number	of	Hazard	Instances	were	declared	against	the	activity	of	digitally	signing	a	
prescription.	This	clinical	activity	results	in	issuing	an	electronic	prescription.	An	electronically	
signed	prescription	is	on	the	boundary	between	multiple	systems	and	authorities,	i.e.	typically	
prescribing	by	doctors,	verification	by	pharmacists,	and	preparation	by	nurses.				
	
The	Hazard	Identification	of	ePAM	is	consistent	with	both	the	medication	error	classification	
based	on	the	medication	process	(prescribing,	transcribing,	dispensing,	administering	and	
monitoring)	42	and	that	based	on	the	type	and	modality,	which	are	often	referred	to	as	“five	
rights”	43.	In	this	particular	case,	type	and	modality	helped	provide	a	detailed	characterisation	of	
the	hazard,	e.g.	adverse	interaction.	The	classification	based	on	the	medication	process	helped	
describe	the	context	of	the	hazard,	e.g.	clinician	prescribed	a	medication	that	has	adverse	
interaction	with	an	existing	medication.	This	is	important	as	it	enables	the	safety	analysts	to	
deploy	risk	controls	which	are	relevant	to	the	specific	phase	in	which	the	hazard	might	occur	45,	
46,	e.g.	prescribing	risk	controls	as	opposed	to	administration	risk	controls.		
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4.2.3	Risk	Analysis		
At	this	stage,	the	causes	and	effects	of	the	Hazard	Instances	were	identified,	considering	human,	
organisational	and	technological	factors,	but	excluding	clinical	factors.	Importantly,	using	
SMART,	this	analysis	was	performed	given	the	specific	clinical	context	associated	with	the	
Hazard	Instance,	i.e.	the	already	defined	activity/decision	in	a	specific	care	process	within	a	
specific	care	setting	and	using	a	specific	HIT	function.	This	helped	ensure	that	the	causes	and	
effects	were	relevant	to	the	Hazard	Instance.	This	also	helped	ensure	that	the	risk	estimation	
and	evaluation,	including	any	necessary	controls,	were	performed	given	the	relevant	contextual	
factors.						
	
The	risk	of	each	Hazard	Instance	was	then	estimated,	based	on	the	the	severity	of	harm	and	the	
likelihood	of	occurrence	of	that	harm	,	e.g.	the	likelihood	that	the	patient	suffers	a	permanent	life-
changing	incapacity	as	the	result	of	the	medication	overdose.	Deciding	on	the	likelihood	and	
severity	parameters	was	a	challenging	task	40,	41.	For	example,	for	the	Hazard	Instance	
‘prescribing	a	medication	to	which	the	patient	is	allergic	’,	it	is	likely	that	there	will	be	relatively	
little	harm	(e.g.	no	reaction,	or	a	mild	rash	etc),	but	there	is	a	very	low	(but	non-zero)	likelihood	
of	a	severe	harm	(e.g.	death).	The	current	likelihood	and	severity	parameters	makes	it	difficult	
to	reconcile	the	fact	that	a	Hazard	Instance	could	result	in	death,	but	is	more	likely	to	result	in	
minor/no	harm.	Essentially	we	found	ourselves	wanting	to	subdivide	these	categories.	
	
Each	risk	was	then	evaluated	against	predefined	acceptability	criteria,	e.g.	as	defined	in	the	risk	
matrix	provided	by	NHS	Digital.	Next,	options	were	identified	and	analysed	for	controlling	the	
risks	that	were	deemed	unacceptable,	e.g.	through	training	and	supervision.	Figure	7	shows	an	
example	Hazard	Instance	Form	in	SMART,	covering	Causes,	Effects	and	Controls	and	including	
traceability	to	the	Hazard	Type,	HIT	Function	and	Care	Process	Step.		
	
Figure	7:	SMART	Risk	Analysis	
5	Discussion	
In	this	research,	we	provided	four	criteria	for	refining	the	notion	of	hazards,	combined	with	
SMART	as	a	modelling	methodology	and	toolset.	The	four	criteria	helped	ensure	that	the	
hazards	identified	are	clinically	meaningful,	particularly	in	how	they	relate	to	patient	care	and	
clinical	practice.	SMART	builds	on	these	principles	by	creating	a	platform	that	brings	together	
clinical	and	technology	models	as	a	prerequisite	and	a	structured	basis	for	Hazard	Identification	
and	Risk	Analysis.	In	this	Section,	we	discuss	the	main	findings	of	the	pilot	and	the	overall	
strengths	and	weaknesses	of	SMART.	
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5.1	Analysis	of	ePAM	using	SMART	
We	report	on	the	key	findings	of	the	ePAM	Hazard	Identification	and	Risk	Analysis	that	we	
performed	using	SMART.	The	findings	are	described	against	the	four	criteria	for	hazard	
conceptualisation	that	are	discussed	in	Section	2.		
Clarity	of	the	Impact	on	Patient	Care	
Deciding	on	how	and	when	the	technology	meets	clinical	practice	was	the	most	significant	
factor	in	identifying	clinically	meaningful	hazards	with	potential	impact	on	patient	care.	In	our	
analysis,	the	explicit	models	of	clinical	processes	and	the	inherent	traceability	with	the	ePAM	
functions	helped	ensure	that	all	associated	Hazard	Instances	were	identified	and	analysed	in	
their	clinical	context.	SMART	does	not	allow	a	Hazard	Instance	to	be	declared	without	specifying	
the	clinical	process,	step	and	setting	within	which	it	might	occur.	To	achieve	this,	the	existing	
medication	processes	had	to	be	simplified	in	order	to	abstract	detailed	technology-oriented	
functions	and	focus	on	the	clinical	steps	and	context.	These	functions	are	important	for	system	
implementation	but	can	often	be	a	distraction	when	performing	a	clinically	meaningful	Hazard	
Identification.			
Hazards	on	the	Boundaries	of	Clinical	Systems	
ePAM	covered	two	clinical	systems:	prescribing	and	allergies	management.	Hazards	were	
identified	on	the	outputs	of	these	systems,	e.g.	‘wrong	medication	dose’	or	‘omission	of	an	
allergy	in	patient	records’.	However,	distinguishing	between	technological	factors	and	clinical	
factors	proved	a	challenge.	For	example,	when	estimating	the	risk	of	a	‘wrong	medication’,	the	
clinicians	estimated	the	totality	of	the	risk	and	not	just	the	risk	due	to	non-clinical	factors,	i.e.	
which	is	the	scope	of	the	analysis.	This	issue	highlights	the	difficulty	of	distinguishing	between	
clinical	and	non-clinical	factors	in	complex	healthcare	services,	especially	when	HIT	functions	
are	intertwined	with	clinical	processes.	The	ideal	situation,	though	not	realistic	in	this	case,	was	
to	perform	Hazard	Identification	and	Risk	Analysis	on	medication	management	as	a	clinical	
service	and	consider	HIT	as	one	of	many	factors.	However,	unfortunately,	similar	to	the	majority	
of	HIT	deployments,	the	sphere	of	control	of	the	multidisciplinary	team	was	the	technology	and	
its	clinical	context	rather	than	the	wider	clinical	practice.	To	some	extent,	the	safety	analysis	had	
to	be	performed	bottom	up.		
Sufficient	Space	for	Detection	and	Mitigation	
The	hazards	were	defined	in	such	a	way	that	controls	were	specified	in	order	to	reduce	the	risk	
to	acceptable	levels.	Most	of	these	controls	were	already	in	place,	e.g.	training	or	supervision	in	
clinical	processes	and	tallman	lettering	for	drug	names.	The	results	of	the	analysis	did	not	
generate	any	significant	new	controls,	which	might	raise	the	questions	as	to	whether	the	safety	
analysis	was	necessary.	On	reflection,	the	analysis	was	essential	for	two	main	reasons	
(excluding	the	need	for	compliance	with	SCCI	160).	Firstly,	the	analysis	clarified	how	HIT	can	
compromise	patient	safety	and	highlighted	the	importance	of	the	existing	controls,	i.e.	the	safety	
significance	of	certain	practices	and	design	features	such	as	redundancy	and	cross-checking.	
Secondly,	the	analysis	highlighted	the	need	to	monitor	the	effectiveness	of	the	controls	and	the	
importance	of	revising	the	risk	estimates	based	on	real	usage	data.	For	example,	making	it	hard	
for	prescribers	to	use	free	text	rather	than	use	predefined	drop-down	lists	is	an	existing	control.	
It	is	now	clear	why	it	is	important	to	regularly	evaluate	and	monitor	the	extent	to	which	
prescribers	are	using	the	predefined	list	rather	than	free	text.			
Distinction	between	Hazards	and	Other	Major	Failures	
Emphasising	that	hazards	are	specific	events	with	specific	characteristics	was	a	challenge.	
Initially,	the	multidisciplinary	team	tended	to	label	every	significant	event	as	a	hazard.	Their	
rationale	was	to	ensure	that	the	event	was	controlled.	By	calling	an	event	a	hazard,	it	was	felt	
	
To	appear	in	the	Health	Informatics	Journal	
that	the	hazard	label	elevated	the	significance	of	the	event.	However,	this	could	result	in	
unnecessarily	large	Hazard	Logs.	In	the	ePAM	Hazard	Identification,	this	issue	was	partly	
resolved	by	agreeing	on	Hazard	Types	prior	to	declaring	Hazard	Instances.	This	helped	show	
that	many	failures	that	would	otherwise	be	labeled	as	hazards	were	still	specified	and	
controlled	as	causes	or	effects.	As	discussed	in	Section	1,	the	source	of	this	confusion	is	the		
generic	definition	of	hazards	as	sources	of	patient	harm.	
	
Finally,	the	above	observations,	particularly	the	importance	of	the	explicit	traceability	between	
the	clinical	setting,	HIT	functionality	and	hazards,	potentially	address	the	weaknesses	reported	
by	Habli	et	al	56	in	their	review	of	the	Hazard	Logs	for	20	different	HIT	systems.	Issues	reported	
included	confusing	clinical	hazards	and	HIT	failures,	with	many	hazards	lacking	a	clear	clinical	
impact	and	context.	These	issues	made	it	difficult	to	assess	the	risk	associated	with	the	hazards	
and	judge	the	suitability	of	the	risk	controls.	
5.2	Overall	Strengths	and	Weaknesses	of	SMART	
Although	the	scope	of	the	pilot	study	was	limited	to	a	specific	setting	and	technology,	it	
provided	insights	and	highlighted	practical	challenges	that	will	inform	the	future	development	
and	evaluation	of	the	SMART.	
	
Despite	the	additional	clarity	and	automated	support	provided	through	SMART,	hazard	
identification	remains	a	complex	task.	This	stems	from	the	scale	of	healthcare,	which	is	
inherently	a	complex	and	adaptive	sociotechnical	system,	and	the	uncertainty	about	actual	
practice,	i.e.	work-as-imagined	vs	work-as-done	52.	For	example,	estimating	the	likelihood	and	
severity	of	the	potential	harms	concerning	a	late	prescription	hazard	in	an	Intensive	Care	Unit	is	
extremely	hard	to	perform.	This	is	due	to	the	sheer	number	of	variables	that	have	to	be	
estimated,	prior	to	the	system	deployment,	concerning	issues	such	as	the	medication	type,	the	
profile	of	the	patients,	the	complexity	of	the	clinical	conditions	and	the	state	of	the	clinical	
setting.	As	such,	proactive	Hazard	Identification	and	Risk	Analysis	is	useful	as	long	as	it	
accompanied	with	a	through-life	safety	management	process	that	continuously	updates	and	
revises	the	clinical	and	technology	models,	and	the	associated	Hazard	Log,	based	on	real-time	
usage	data.	That	is,	workarounds	are	common	in	healthcare.	They	often	stem	from	the	realities	
of	complex	clinical	practice,	which	are	hard	to	completely	model	prior	to	deployment.	The	
continuous	evaluation	and	updating	of	the	clinical	process	models	and	their	associated	safety	
evidence	is	essential	for	maintaining	the	validity	of	the	overall	safety	cases.	One	approach	to	
achieving	this,	and	reducing	the	gap	between	work-as-imagined	vs	work-as-done,	is	via	the	
notion	of	dynamic	safety	cases	48	that	supplement	proactive	safety	analysis	with	reactive	
analysis	of	data	collected	from	actual	practices	(e.g.	via	Bayesian	Network	49).	
Further,	the	use	of	standard	risk	matrices	for	HIT,	e.g.	five	likelihood	ratings	versus	five	severity	
ratings,	seems	to	be	too	coarse	to	cater	for	the	inherent	risks	that	are	due	to	the	clinical	
conditions	or	the	complexity	of	clinical	decision	making.	That	is,	a	difficulty	was	the	fact	that	the	
likelihood	and	severity	ratings	seem	to	be	"overall"	as	opposed	to	risk	profiles	that	cater	for	
combinations	that	cover	high	likelihoods	of	non-severe	events	and	low	likelihoods	of		severe	
events	As	such,	the	extent	of	the	harms	caused	by	the	technology	compared	to	those	resulting	
from	the	clinical	condition	or	disease	is	hard	to	determine.	This	highlights	the	need	to	explore	
alternative	means	for	risk	estimation	for	HIT,	building	on	measures	such	as	Quality-Adjusted	
Life-Years	(QALYs)	53.	This	also	emphasises	the	importance	of	monitoring	and	collecting	usage	
data	in	order	to	continuously	revise	the	risk	estimates	and	the	underlying	models	of	the	clinical	
processes	and	settings.		
	
A	related	important	matter	is	risk	proportionality.	SMART	provides	clinicians	and	engineers	
with	traceability	data	needed	for	analysing	how	the	level	of	rigour	and	detail	in	the	safety	
evidence	is	commensurate	with	the	criticality	of	the	clinical	setting	and	HIT	functionality.	What	
is	proportionate	and	therefore	acceptable	is	a	debatable	and	an	ethically	sensitive	matter	on	
which	standards	and	legal	systems	have	differed,	i.e.	similar	to	the	discussion	regarding	the	‘As	
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Low	As	Reasonably	Practicable’	ALARP	principle	47.	Most	standards	provide	templates	for	risk	
matrices	that	distinguish	between	acceptable,	tolerable	and	intolerable	levels	of	risks	14,	16,	17.	
Under	exceptional	circumstances,	these	standards	allow	engineers	and	clinicians	to	appeal	to	
risk-benefit	analysis	to	show	that	the	clinical	benefits	outweigh	the	technological	risks.	 
	
Our	study	provides	further	evidence	concerning	the	importance	of	treating	HIT	safety	assurance	
as	a	socio-technical	process,	involving	both	clinical	and	engineering	stakeholders	13,	50.	This	was	
exemplified	in	the	difficulty	of	modelling	the	HIT	functions	given	the	variable	nature	of	clinical	
settings;	a	significant	issue	that	has	been	highlighted	in	the	patient	safety	literature	51,	57	.	The	
current	literature	on	Resilience	Engineering	58	and	Safety	2.0	59	emphasise	the	need	to	redefine	
the	notion	of	variability.	This	is	in	order	to	help	distinguish	between,	on	the	one	hand,	unsafe	
violations	and,	on	the	other	hand,	desirable	performance	adjustments	that	are	necessary	to	
ensure	the	ability	of	the	system	to	maintain	safety,	given	changing	demands	and	disturbances.	
The	Systems	Engineering	Initiative	for	Patient	Safety	(SEIPS	2.0)	51	also	now	more	explicitly	
considers	variability	through	the	concepts	of	configuration	and	adaptation.	
	
Finally,	there	are	cultural	challenges	with	risk	analysis	for	HIT.	On	the	one	hand,	many	
organisations	still	adopt	a	strategy	of	"organisational	ignorance"	54	when	it	comes	to	HIT	risks,	
and	they	rely	almost	exclusively	on	HIT	suppliers	to	develop	"safe"	systems	.	On	the	other	hand,	
and	more	positively,	the	introduction	of	the	NHS	Digital	Academy	with	a	remit	to	train	clinical	
information	officers	can	be	seen	as	one	instrument	to	bring	about	the	required	cultural	change	
55.	Further,	many	HIT	systems	are	procured	because	of	their	perceived	patient	safety	benefits.	
By	identifying	hazards	that	are	posed	by	the	system	itself,	safety	analysis	can	be	seen	as	
introducing	hurdles	to	the	introduction	of	a	technology	that	is	intended	to	reduce	medical	
errors.	As	such,	more	balanced	debates	are	needed	in	order	to	identify,	analyse	and,	where	
necessary,	tradeoff	clinical	benefits	and	technological	risks.		
6	Conclusions		
Current	definitions	of	hazards	are	high	level	and	generic.	As	such	they	are	hard	to	interpret.	This	
is	particularly	the	case	for	large	HIT	systems	used	in	complex	socio-technical	settings.	Although	
hazard-directed	safety	processes	are	prominent	in	other	safety-critical	industries,	the	notion	of	
hazards	has	to	be	refined	and	evaluated	further	in	order	to	fit	the	complexity	and	scale	of	
healthcare	services.	Publicly-available	exemplar	hazard	logs	and	safety	cases	are	needed	in	
order	to	inform	the	debate	concerning	appropriate	safety	analysis	approaches	to	HIT.	
	
Two	areas	of	further	work	are	important:	(1)	further	development	of	SMART	in	order	to	
incorporate	established	socio-technical	models	such	as	SEIPS	2.0	51	and	(2)	incorporating	means	
for	updating	the	clinical	models	and	safety	evidence	dynamically	based	on	real-time	data.	The	
combination	of	these	two	areas	would	help	ensure	that	the	safety	analysis	reflects	the	complex	
and	adaptive	sociotechnical	realities	of	clinical	practice	and	reduces	the	gap	between	work-as-
imagined	vs	work-as-done.	
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